ZARELLA, J.

The sole issue in these appeals is whether General Statutes § 1-217,1 which prohibits public agencies from disclosing, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (act); General Statutes § 1-200 et seq.; the home addresses of various federal, state and local government officials and employees, is applicable to grand lists of motor vehicles2 and their component data provided to town assessors by the department of motor vehicles (department) pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 14-163.3 The plaintiffs, the commissioner of public safety, the commissioner of children and families, the commissioner of correction (state agencies), the judicial branch, Nicholas Mullane II and Darryl DelGrosso, as first selectman and assessor, respectively, of the town of North Stonington (town), and AFSCME, Council 4, Locals 387, 391 and 1565 (union), each appeal4 from the judgments of the trial court dismissing their administrative appeals from the decision of the named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission), ordering DelGrosso to provide to the complainant, Peter Sachs, an exact electronic copy of the file that the department had provided to the town pursuant to § 14-163. We conclude that § 1-217 applies to motor vehicle grand lists and their component data provided to the town assessors pursuant to § 14-163. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. On June 16, 2008, the complainant, who is licensed as an attorney and a private investigator, asked DelGrosso to provide him with an exact electronic copy of the file, known electronically as "MVR102.dat," that the department had provided to DelGrosso pursuant to § 14-163 for use in preparing the town's motor vehicle grand list (electronic file).5 The various electronic files provided by the department6 contain complete lists of all motor vehicles and snowmobiles garaged in a particular town, and registration information including each vehicle owner's name, registration address and birth date, as well as the vehicle's year, make, model and vehicle identification number. When DelGrosso creates the town's motor vehicle grand list, he modifies the electronic file prior to publicizing the list by, inter alia, redacting the registration addresses, which generally correspond to the residential addresses, of approximately forty town residents, including judges, state troopers and correction employees, which he identifies as protected from disclosure by § 1-217.7 On June 17, 2008, DelGrosso replied to the complainant that the entire electronic file was protected from disclosure pursuant to § 1-217, but offered to provide a version with the redaction of approximately forty names and addresses protected under that statute, if the complainant would compensate the town for DelGrosso's time, payable in advance.

On June 18, 2008, the complainant appealed from DelGrosso's denial of his request to the commission, and the plaintiffs subsequently intervened as parties to those proceedings.8 Following a contested case hearing, the commission accepted the report of its commissioner, who was acting as the hearing officer, and issued a decision9 finding that the electronic file is the electronic version of the town's motor vehicle grand list and concluding that, under Davis v. Freedom of Information Commission, 47 Conn.Sup. 309, 790 A.2d 1188 (2001), aff'd, 259 Conn. 45, 787 A.2d 530 (2002) (per curiam), General Statutes § 12-55(a) does not permit redactions or omissions from the grand list that the assessor is required to lodge for public inspection. The commission determined that "the names and addresses of the people whose property comprises the motor vehicle grand list are both necessary and integral to the completeness and accuracy of the list, as well as the reasons why it is publicly available," and that construing § 1-217 "to permit the [plaintiffs] to redact any names or residential addresses from the motor vehicle grand list would require finding an implicit repeal of § 12-55(a)... and Connecticut's historical [practice] of making grand lists, including [those limited to] personal property grand lists, available to the public for correction and disputation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sachs v. Freedom of Information Commission, Docket No. FIC 2008-412 (January 14, 2009). The commission further concluded that § 1-217 "applies only to the agency for which a protected employee works," and "does not exempt from disclosure names and residential addresses when they are part of grand lists." Id. Accordingly, the commission ordered the town to provide to the complainant an exact electronic copy of the electronic file. Id.

The plaintiffs filed separate administrative appeals from the decision of the commission to the trial court pursuant to General Statutes §§ 4-183 and 1-206. After granting the plaintiffs' unopposed motions for a stay of the commission's decision, the trial court consolidated the five matters for a hearing and decision. Thereafter, the court issued a memorandum of decision concluding that the commission's factual determination that the electronic file was in essence the town's motor vehicle grand list was supported by substantial evidence, and that the plaintiffs' proffered interpretation of § 1-217 "is inconsistent with the long-standing right of the public to inspect the entire grand list." The trial court noted that, although the court in Davis v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 47 Conn.Supp. at 309, 790 A.2d 1188, "did not consider the applicability of § 1-217 to the assessor's role, [that case recognizes] the well-recognized presumption in favor of openness in the preparation and dissemination of the § 12-55 grand list." The trial court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that, based on the town's population, "full disclosure of the grand list would mean that the addresses of persons protected by § 1-217 would be easily revealed" because the compilation of names and addresses did "not identify any person as one in the § 1-217 class...." The trial court further concluded that "it would undercut the `harmony' of § 12-55 with § 1-217 to allow or require the assessor to redact either the [electronic file] or the grand list before it becomes publicly available."10 Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgments dismissing the administrative appeals. These appeals followed.11 See footnote 4 of this opinion.

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that § 12-55 is inapplicable to this case because the electronic file is not the motor vehicle grand list; rather, they argue it is raw data that the assessor must check for accuracy, including equalizing assessments, before taking an oath on the list pursuant to § 12-55(b). The plaintiffs further claim that, even if the electronic file is the equivalent of the motor vehicle grand list, the trial court improperly concluded that a grand list made public pursuant to § 12-55(a) is not subject to redaction under § 1-217. Finally, the state agencies claim that the enactment of Public Acts 2010, No. 10-110, § 22 (P.A. 10-110), has rendered these appeals moot by resolving the statutory issue conclusively in their favor.

I

As a threshold matter, we address the state agencies' claim, made in a supplemental authorities letter submitted pursuant to Practice Book § 67-10, that the enactment of P.A. 10-110, § 22, has rendered these appeals moot by resolving the statutory issue conclusively in their favor. In P.A. 10-110, § 22, the legislature amended § 14-163 by, inter alia, adding a new subsection (c) which provides: "No assessor or tax collector shall disclose any information contained in any list provided by the commissioner pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of this section if the commissioner is not required to provide such information or if such information is protected from disclosure under state or federal law." See also footnote 3 of this opinion.

"Whether an action is moot implicates a court's subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a question of law over which we exercise plenary review.... A case is considered moot if [the] court cannot grant the appellant any practical relief through its disposition of the merits...." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Vincent Metro, LLC v. Yah Realty, LLC, 297 Conn. 489, 495, 1 A.3d 1026 (2010). As a jurisdictional matter, we disagree with the state agencies with respect to the potential effect of P.A. 10-110, § 22. Even if P.A. 10-110, § 22, is directly on point, operates retroactively and, therefore, conclusively resolves these appeals in the plaintiffs' favor, it does not render them moot. It simply would change the analysis by which we provide the plaintiffs with their desired practical relief of reversing the judgments of the trial court.

With respect to the import of P.A. 10-110, § 22, itself, we further conclude that, even if deemed retroactively applicable, it is not by itself dispositive of this appeal. Although P.A. 10-110, § 22, precludes assessors from disclosing information provided by the department that is "protected from disclosure under state or federal law," that phrase simply begs the question presented by the commission's arguments in this appeal, namely, that § 1-217 is inapplicable to grand lists and their component data.

II

With respect to the plaintiffs' statutory claims, they contend that, even assuming that the electronic file is the equivalent of the motor vehicle grand list,12 the trial court nevertheless improperly concluded that a grand list made public pursuant to § 12-55(a) is not subject to redaction under § 1-217. To this end, the state agencies and the union argue that the trial court improperly relied on Davis v. Freedom of Information Commission, 47 Conn.Sup. 309, 790 A.2d 1188 (2001), aff'd, 259 Conn. 45, 787 A.2d 530 (2002) (per curiam), and Gold v. McDermott, 32 Conn.Sup. 583, 347 A.2d 643 (App.Sess. 1975), because those cases did not concern § 1-217 or any other exceptions to the act applicable to assessors. Rather, the plaintiffs claim that the language of § 1-217 clearly and unambiguously effectuates its purpose of protecting the enumerated categories of government employees and officials whose employment duties expose them to individuals who might wish to harm them or their families. Relying on the legislature's recent rejection of amendments to § 1-217 that expressly would have permitted the disclosure of these addresses in connection with, inter alia, grand lists or voter registration lists, the plaintiffs further contend that the commission's construction of § 1-217 is illogical because it shields that information from disclosure by some, but not all, sources, and, as put by the state agencies, affords "no protection at all from a creative and inquisitive miscreant bent on locating and harming a specific individual or his/her family." Thus, the plaintiffs, noting the more limited scope of the redactions performed initially by the department pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 14-10(e)13 before providing the electronic file, argue that DelGrosso properly declined to provide the electronic file to the complainant without first redacting information therein protected by § 1-217.

In response, the commission, emphasizing that the trial court properly deferred to its statutory analysis, contends that any redaction of the grand list, including the electronic file that essentially is the town's motor vehicle grand list, contravenes centuries of well settled common and statutory law requiring that the grand list, as the tax roll, be complete, accurate and open for public inspection. The commission also relies on Davis v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 47 Conn. Supp. at 309, 790 A.2d 1188, and contends that, in the absence of specific language on point, § 12-55(a) does not permit any redactions to or omissions from a motor vehicle grand list, even if other laws preclude the disclosure of certain information contained therein. The commission further contends that the plaintiffs' application of § 1-217 impermissibly would work an implied repeal of § 12-55, and, given the practical issues attendant to notifying the assessor of those residents who are protected under § 1-217, is unworkable and promises only illusory protection, especially in larger municipalities.14

Assuming, without deciding, that substantial evidence supports the commission's determination that the electronic file is the equivalent of the motor vehicle grand list, we conclude that § 1-217 applies to motor vehicle grand lists and any component data provided pursuant to § 14-163. Accordingly, we disagree with the decision of the trial court holding to the contrary.

It is well established that an administrative agency's decision under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., with respect to the construction of a statute is not entitled to special deference when that determination "has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to] ... a governmental agency's time-tested interpretation...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 298 Conn. 703, 716-17, 6 A.3d 763 (2010). Thus, because this case presents an issue of statutory construction that has never been subjected to judicial scrutiny and lacks a time-tested agency interpretation, the commission's determination regarding the applicability of § 1-217 to motor vehicle grand lists promulgated pursuant to § 12-55, and their component data, is not entitled to the traditional deference normally accorded an agency's interpretation.15 Instead, "[w]ell settled principles of statutory interpretation govern our review.... Because statutory interpretation is a question of law, our review is de novo.... When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 720-21, 6 A.3d 763.

Resolution of the issue in the present case requires an examination of three related statutes. Section 12-55(a) provides in relevant part: "On or before the thirtyfirst day of January of each year, except as otherwise specifically provided by law, the assessors or board of assessors shall publish the grand list for their respective towns. Each such grand list shall contain the assessed values of all property in the town.... The assessor or board of assessors shall lodge the grand list for public inspection, in the office of the assessor on or before said thirty-first day of January, or on or before the day otherwise specifically provided by law for the completion of such grand list...." Section 1-217(a) provides in relevant part: "No public agency may disclose, under the Freedom of Information Act, the residential address" of the public officials and employees designated therein. Section 1-210(a) provides in relevant part: "Except as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency ... shall be public records and every person shall have the right to... (1) inspect such records...." (Emphasis added.)

Reading these statutes together, as we are required to do by § 1-2z, we conclude that there is no ambiguity regarding a town assessor's obligation not to disclose the home addresses of the designated public officials and employees when making a grand list and its component data available for public inspection, despite the lack of an explicit exception in § 12-55, because § 1-217(a) prohibits the disclosure of such information and § 1-210(a) expressly supports this prohibition by permitting exceptions to disclosure when specifically authorized by any federal law or state statute. As recently noted by this court in validating exceptions to the disclosure provision of the act in another context, "[t]he exemptions contained in [various state statutes] reflect a legislative intention to balance the public's right to know what its agencies are doing, with the governmental and private needs for confidentiality.... [I]t is this balance of the governmental and private needs for confidentiality with the public right to know that must govern the interpretation and application of the [act]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 298 Conn. at 726, 6 A.3d 763. Accordingly, the trial court improperly determined that grand lists and their component data are not subject to redaction under the statutory scheme and improperly dismissed the plaintiffs' administrative appeals.

We disagree with the concurrence that the statutory scheme is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation and is sufficiently ambiguous to justify resort to extratextual sources, including the legislative history of § 1-217(a). Although the concurrence concludes, and we agree, that "the text of § 1-217(a) applies only to requests under the act," the concurrence nonetheless finds that the statute is ambiguous and examines the legislative history because the statute "does not impose a blanket of confidentiality over protected individuals' addresses for all purposes, and nothing in the text of § 12-55(a) expressly provides for any exceptions with respect to the publication of the grand list or authorizes any redactions from the final published list." (Emphasis added.) Whether the statute imposes "a blanket of confidentiality over protected individuals' addresses" in any other context, however, is irrelevant. The question presented in this appeal is whether the commission properly ordered the disclosure of information "in response to a citizen's freedom of information request" under § 1-217(a). Thus, under the concurrence's own reasoning, § 1-217(a) clearly applies to the request in this case because, as the concurrence concedes, "the text of § 1-217(a) applies ... to requests under the act...."16

To the extent the concurrence joins the trial court in relying, "[p]urely by way of background," on Gold v. McDermott, [supra, 32 Conn.Supp. at 583, 347 A.2d 643], and Davis v. Freedom of Information Commission, [supra, 47 Conn.Supp. at 309, 790 A.2d 1188], for the proposition that records collected in connection with the preparation of the grand list generally are subject to disclosure under § 12-55, its discussion of those cases is an unnecessary distraction in light of its acknowledgment that the analysis in Davis, like that in Gold, "begs the legal question presented in this appeal ... [because §] 1-217 is not mentioned anywhere in either decision, likely because it did not become applicable to local governments until after October 1, 1999 [twenty-four years after Gold was decided] ... and there was no mention in either case of providing the requested documents subject to any kind of redaction." (Citation omitted.) We thus do not understand how a discussion of Gold and Davis is germane to the analysis in this case.

The judgments are reversed and the cases are remanded with direction to sustain the appeals.

In this opinion ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER and McLACHLAN, Js., concurred.

NORCOTT, J., with whom EVELEIGH, J., joins, concurring.

Like the majority, Justice Eveleigh and I conclude that General Statutes § 1-217(a),1 which prohibits public agencies from disclosing, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (act); General Statutes § 1-200 et seq.; the home addresses of various federal, state and local government officials and employees, is applicable to the grand list of motor vehicles subject to property taxation in each town, promulgated pursuant to General Statutes § 12-55,2 and its component data provided by the department of motor vehicles (department) to the town assessors pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 14-163.3 The majority and I part company en route to that conclusion with respect to our applications of the plain meaning rule; see General Statutes § 1-2z;4 to this statutory scheme. Specifically, I conclude that the text of the statutory scheme ultimately is subject to more than one reasonable reading and is therefore sufficiently ambiguous to justify resort to extratextual sources, specifically, the legislative history of § 1-217(a). A review of the legislative history readily confirms, however, what seems initially apparent from the somewhat ambiguous text of the statutory scheme, namely, that § 1-217(a) applies to motor vehicle grand lists and their component data. Accordingly, I join the court in reversing the judgments of the trial court dismissing the administrative appeals filed by the various state and local plaintiffs,5 from the decision of the named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission), ordering Darryl DelGrosso, the assessor of the town of North Stonington (town), to provide to the complainant, Peter Sachs, an exact electronic copy of the file that the motor vehicles department had provided to the town pursuant to § 14-163.

I begin by adopting the statement of facts and procedural history, the recitation of the parties' arguments, and the standard of review set forth in the majority opinion. I also assume that substantial evidence supports the commission's finding that the electronic file is in essence the motor vehicle grand list promulgated pursuant to § 12-55(a). Finally, I note that in applying the plain meaning rule, codified as § 1-2z; see footnote 4 of this concurring opinion; a statute is ambiguous, thus permitting consideration of extratextual evidence of its meaning, if "when read in context, [it] is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 298 Conn. 703, 720, 6 A.3d 763 (2010).

The primary provision of the act, General Statutes § 1-210(a), provides in relevant part: "Except as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency, whether or not such records are required by any law or by any rule or regulation, shall be public records.... Any agency rule or regulation, or part thereof, that conflicts with the provisions of this subsection or diminishes or curtails in any way the rights granted by this subsection shall be void...." (Emphasis added.) Section 1-217(a), the provision of the act at issue in this appeal, then provides: "No public agency may disclose, under the Freedom of Information Act, the residential address of any of the following persons," and then names twelve categories of public employees and officials subject to the statute's protections, which include, for example, state and federal judges, various correction and law enforcement officers, judicial branch employees, current and former prosecutors and public defenders. See footnote 1 of this concurring opinion for the full text of § 1-217(a). Subsection (b) of that statute then provides: "The business address of any person described in this section shall be subject to disclosure under section 1-210. The provisions of this section shall not apply to Department of Motor Vehicles records described in section 14-10."6

Standing by itself, the plain language of § 1-217(a) seems to preclude a public agency, which would include the office of a town assessor, from disclosing pursuant to the act the residential addresses of those protected by the statute. Section 1-2z requires, however, that a statute's language be read in connection with related statutes, which, in this case involving a motor vehicle grand list, would be § 12-55(a), which provides in relevant part: "On or before the thirty-first day of January of each year, except as otherwise specifically provided by law, the assessors or board of assessors shall publish the grand list for their respective towns. Each such grand list shall contain the assessed values of all property in the town.... The assessor or board of assessors shall lodge the grand list for public inspection, in the office of the assessor on or before said thirty-first day of January, or on or before the day otherwise specifically provided by law for the completion of such grand list...." (Emphasis added.) Viewed together, then, the text of § 1-217(a) applies only to requests under the act and does not impose a blanket of confidentiality over protected individuals' addresses for all purposes, and nothing in the text of § 12-55(a) expressly provides for any exceptions with respect to the publication of the grand list or authorizes any redactions from the final published list. Thus, § 12-55(a) reasonably could be read to provide an alternate avenue for the disclosure of information otherwise protected by § 1-217(a), namely, inclusion on the grand list published by the assessor pursuant to his general and unqualified publication obligations. This would suggest, then, a practical limitation on the exception from disclosure under the act provided by § 1-217(a). Although this result, vigorously advocated by the commission, may well seem anomalous, in my view, it is sufficiently reasonable to permit resort to the relevant extratextual sources under the analysis pursuant to § 1-2z, given the long tradition of the openness of grand lists.7 See, e.g., Rocky Hill Inc. District v. Hartford Rayon Corp., 122 Conn. 392, 403, 190 A. 264 (1937); Davis v. Freedom of Information Commission, 47 Conn.Sup. 309, 310, 790 A.2d 1188 (2001), aff'd, 259 Conn. 45, 787 A.2d 530 (2002) (per curiam).

Purely by way of background, I begin, however, with the case law relied upon by the trial court and the commission. In Gold v. McDermott, 32 Conn.Sup. 583, 587-88, 347 A.2d 643 (App.Sess.1975), the Appellate Session of the Superior Court extended the openness of the grand list itself to its component parts, concluding that "documents and materials ... which contain raw valuation data and assessment data compiled by the city of Hartford and a private firm under a contract for revaluation of taxable properties in the city for purposes of real estate taxation, [fell] within the definition" of "public records" subject to disclosure under an earlier version of the act, despite the fact that such documents had never actually been used to create the grand list. In so concluding, the court rejected the city of Hartford's claim that "§ 12-55 regulates inspection of assessment records, limits such inspection to completed grand lists only, and falls within the exception clause of [General Statutes] § 1-19 [now § 1-210]," noting that § 12-55 "merely imposes an affirmative duty on the assessor to make completed grand lists available for public inspection. Section 12-55 neither refers to the making or inspection of assessment records nor expressly limits public inspection to grand lists only." Id., at 590, 347 A.2d 643. Significantly, however, the court emphasized that "[c]oncluding that a document is a public record within the meaning of § 1-19 ... does not give rise to an automatic right of inspection. If the document falls within one of the exceptions or exclusions found in [the act], then inspection will be precluded." (Emphasis added.) Id., at 589, 347 A.2d 643.

The emphasis in Gold on potential exemptions from disclosure under the act, even in the context of grand lists and their component data, brings me to Davis v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 47 Conn.Supp. at 309, 790 A.2d 1188. According to the trial court's decision in Davis, which this court adopted as the proper statement of the law; see Davis v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 259 Conn. at 55-56, 787 A.2d 530; on March 2, 1999, an insurance company investigator had requested the "motor vehicle grand list books for 1997 and 1998. The tax assessor's office denied [the investigator's] request on the grounds that the tax assessor is prohibited from disclosing motor vehicle information contained in such lists pursuant to the federal Drivers Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 et seq. ([federal] act) and General Statutes § 14-10, as amended by No. 97-266 of the 1997 Public Acts (P.A. 97-266)." Davis v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 47 Conn.Supp. at 310-11, 790 A.2d 1188. The court concluded that the commission properly had ordered the assessor to provide access to inspect the tax books because the prohibitions against disclosure contained in the federal act and General Statutes §§ 14-10 and 14-50a (d) by their "express terms" applied only to state motor vehicle departments and, therefore, did not preclude assessors from disclosing "personal information," such as an individual's name and address, in the motor vehicle grand list.8 Id., at 315-16, 790 A.2d 1188. Thus, the court determined that, under § 14-163, which requires the department to provide the relevant names, addresses and vehicular information, and § 12-55(a), which requires assessors to lodge the grand list for public inspection, the assessor could not refuse to disclose that information.9 Id., at 317-18, 790 A.2d 1188.

Although Davis is factually on point, it, like the discussion in Gold of the various exemptions from disclosure under the act then in effect, begs the legal question presented in this appeal. Section 1-217 is not mentioned anywhere in either decision, likely because it did not become applicable to local governments until after October 1, 1999; see Public Acts 1999, No. 99-156, § 3 (P.A. 99-156); and there was no mention in either case of providing the requested documents subject to any kind of redaction. Thus, I now turn to a discussion of the history and genealogy of § 1-217, which the legislature enacted to protect the safety of certain public officials and employees by shielding their home addresses from disclosure under the act to potentially dangerous individuals.

The legislature first enacted § 1-217 in 1995 as Public Acts 1995, No. 95-163,10 originally codified at General Statutes § 1-20f, to prohibit state agencies from disclosing, pursuant to the act, the home addresses of federal court judges and magistrates, state court judges, family support magistrates, state and municipal police officers, department of correction employees, and past or present prosecutors and public defenders, "to the extent that they so request." 38 S. Proc., Pt. 11, 1995 Sess., pp. 3736-37, remarks of Senator Winthrop Smith, Jr. The hearing testimony before the joint standing committee on government administration and elections indicates that the legislature enacted § 1-217 to address11 the security risk first realized when the department of correction had to comply with a prison inmate's request, filed pursuant to the act, for the names of every correction officer in the state, some of which could then be cross-referenced with the gun permit owners' database to yield the officers' home addresses. See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Government Administration and Elections, Pt. 2, 1995 Sess., pp. 419-21, remarks of Michael Ferrucci, executive assistant to the director of the correction officers union; see also id., at pp. 673-75, remarks of Dennis O'Connor, lobbyist for the correction officers union (noting lack of prohibition of disclosure of addresses, and discussing possibility that gang members could review land, tax and voting records to ascertain residential addresses of correction and police officers).

The legislature made two changes to § 1-217 relevant to this appeal in 1999.12 In Public Acts 1999, No. 99-77, § 1, the legislature expanded the scope of the statute to include parole board members and employees and, more significantly, eliminated the requirement that the protected employee or official make a written request for nondisclosure and furnish their business address instead, thereby making such protection "[automatic]...." 42 S. Proc., Pt. 5, 1999 Sess., p. 1516, remarks of Senator Donald Williams, Jr.; see id. ("what the amendment would do would get rid of that requirement so that they would automatically be protected without the necessity of filing such a written request"); 42 H.R. Proc., Pt. 6, 1999 Sess., p. 2090, remarks of Representative Michael P. Lawlor ("as an automatic procedure the business address as opposed to their residential address would be provided for the covered state employees").

The second significant amendment to the statute in 1999 came with P.A. 99-156, § 3, which substituted the term "public agency" for the previous language that had rendered the statute applicable only to a "state department, agency, board, council, commission or institution...." Public Acts 1995, No. 95-163. The legislature enacted P.A. 99-156 as a comprehensive response to the potential threat posed to correction employees and facilities caused when inmates or their associates obtained otherwise protected information by filing requests under the act with municipal, rather than state, agencies; it required, inter alia, notification to the commissioner of correction of requests filed by inmates.13 See 42 S. Proc., Pt. 8, 1999 Sess., pp. 2782-84, remarks of Senator John Kissel (discussing growing "abuse" of freedom of information process by inmates, including requests to town clerks for correction officers' addresses); Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Government Administration and Elections, Pt. 4, 1999 Sess., p. 1001, exchange between John Armstrong, commissioner of correction, and Representative Alex Knopp (observing that local zoning commission receiving request for map or engineering plan would notify commissioner of correction, who would then determine whether compliance fell "within the area of being a threat to safety and security"); id., at p. 1003, remarks of Senator Kissel ("the topographic map of the maximum security facility in Somers ... certainly shouldn't be in the hot hands of convicted felons"). Particularly given the expansion in 1999 of the applicability of § 1-217 beyond state agencies to municipalities, and committee testimony that would apply it to land and tax records, the legislative history supports a conclusion that the legislature intended § 1-217 to protect the residential addresses of a broad group of public officials and employees, and did not envision excepting entire classes of governmental records, including grand lists, from its reach.14

The commission argues, however, that this construction of § 1-217 is unworkable and inconsistent with the legislature's intent, and relies upon Public Acts 2005, No. 05-278 (P.A. 05-278),15 which was approved by the legislature, but vetoed by the governor, and would have, inter alia, restricted the application of § 1-217 only to the public agency to which an official or employee belongs, and provided that it does not "exempt from disclosure the residential addresses of elected officials or residential addresses listed on a grand list, tax delinquency list, elector registration or enrollment form, voting list or any record that is otherwise required by law to be disclosed to the public." P.A. 05-278, § 1. The commission, citing the governor's veto statement, contends that P.A. 05-278 demonstrates the legislature's desire to narrow the application of § 1-217, especially given that it was vetoed only because of a separate provision that would have excluded legislators' e-mails from the disclosure requirements of the act. See Message of Governor M. Jodi Rell Accompanying Veto of House Bill No. 6774 (July 11, 2005) (criticizing e-mail provision because it was adopted late on final night of legislative session, "without significant debate or discussion" or public hearing, and not discussing remainder of act). As noted by the plaintiffs, however, the commission's reliance on the history of P.A. 05-278 is belied by the multiplicity of more recent unsuccessful attempts to amend § 1-217 in a similar manner, supported by the commission, which did not progress beyond committee. See Raised Bill No. 5528, 2008 Sess., § 4 (died in judiciary committee); Raised Bill No. 5583, 2006 Sess., § 1 (died in government administration and elections committee). "Ordinarily, we are reluctant to draw inferences regarding legislative intent from the failure of a legislative committee to report a bill to the floor, because in most cases the reasons for that lack of action remain unexpressed and thus obscured in the [midst] of committee inactivity."16 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Social Services v. Saunders, 247 Conn. 686, 706, 724 A.2d 1093 (1999). Multiple attempts to amend a statute to achieve a particular result may, however, support an inference that the existing statute is inconsistent with that result, especially when that inference finds support in the legislative history of the failed bills. See Vacco v. Microsoft Corp., 260 Conn. 59, 79-81, 793 A.2d 1048 (2002) (discussing multiplicity of unsuccessful so-called "Illinois Brick [Co.] repealer bills" that would have nullified at state level United States Supreme Court holding; Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 [1977]; in concluding that, as under federal laws that guide their interpretation, state antitrust statutes do not permit indirect purchasers to bring actions under state antitrust act).

I further disagree with the commission's contention that holding § 1-217 applicable to grand lists and their component data impermissibly works an implied repeal of § 12-55(a). "The legislature is presumed to be aware and to have knowledge of all existing statutes and the effect which its own action or nonaction may have on them." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nunno v. Wixner, 257 Conn. 671, 682, 778 A.2d 145 (2001). "[I]t is a well established rule of statutory construction that repeal of the provisions of a statute by implication is not favored and will not be presumed where the old and the new statutes, in this case [§§ 1-217 and 12-55(a)], can peacefully coexist.... If, by any fair interpretation, we can find a reasonable field of operation for both [§§ 1-217 and 12-55(a)], without destroying or perverting their meaning and intent, it is our duty to reconcile them and give them concurrent effect." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rivera v. Commissioner of Correction, 254 Conn. 214, 242, 756 A.2d 1264 (2000). "It is well established that, because we presume that the legislature does not intend to draft meaningless provisions, we are bound to harmonize otherwise conflicting statutes to the maximum extent possible without thwarting their intended purpose."17 State v. Tabone, 292 Conn. 417, 434, 973 A.2d 74 (2009).

Even assuming, without deciding, that there is some conflict between § 12-55(a) and § 1-217, that conflict is easily reconcilable. Although "tax assessments are matters of public record" under § 12-55(a); Cherniske v. Jajer, 171 Conn. 372, 377, 370 A.2d 981 (1976); the openness of tax records is intended to permit taxpayers to evaluate the accuracy and fairness of the values assessed to their property, thus aiding in ensuring a fair and rational local property tax scheme. See Rocky Hill Inc. District v. Hartford Rayon Corp., supra, 122 Conn. at 403, 190 A. 264. In the present case, the commission has not demonstrated either that DelGrosso has declined to provide assessment data specifically, or more globally, any reason why a person seeking to determine the fairness and accuracy of a motor vehicle assessment needs to know at which address a vehicle is garaged in a particular municipality in order to accomplish that task, and I cannot conceive of one.18 Accordingly, I conclude that the trial court improperly concluded that § 1-217 does not apply to motor vehicle grand lists or their component data.19

Therefore, I concur in the judgment reversing the judgments of the trial court and remanding the cases to that court with direction to sustain the administrative appeals.